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By William E. Odom

William E. Odom is the highest-ranking member of the U.S. Intelligence group ever to write down a booklet outlining primary restructuring of this gigantic community of firms, expertise, and human brokers. within the wake of September 11, Odom has revised and up to date a robust critique he wrote numerous years in the past for staffs of the U.S. congressional committee overseeing the mammoth American intelligence paperwork. His concepts for revamping this crucial portion of American protection at the moment are to be had for basic readers in addition to for policymakers. whereas giving an unequalled review of the realm of U.S. intelligence, Odom persuasively exhibits that the failure of yank intelligence on 11th of September had a lot to do with the complicated bureaucratic relationships present one of the a number of parts of the Intelligence group. The sustained fragmentation in the Intelligence group due to the fact international struggle II is a part of the tale; the blurring of protection and intelligence tasks is one other. Odom describes a number of the parts of yankee intelligence for you to supply readers an knowing of ways complicated they're and what could be performed to cause them to more suitable in delivering well timed intelligence and extra effective in utilizing their huge budgets. He indicates definitively that they can't be remedied with speedy fixes yet require deep learn of the whole forms and the dedication of the U.S. govt to enforce the mandatory reforms.

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The needs of executive branch policymakers, for whom this intelligence was primarily produced, tended to be secondary in both agencies’ calculations. The handling of intelligence analysis on al Qaeda in the weeks and days leading up to the events of 11 September 2001 offers another example of problems in both analysis and distribution of intelligence. The FBI’s jealousy over its counterintelligence turf, not only vis-à-vis the CIA but also vis-à-vis the military services’ counterintelligence analysis (as well as operations), is a similar symptom of structural problems.

The raw versus all-source intelligence issue is at the heart of deciding how best to provide intelligence support to a homeland defense department. Giving the responsibility to the CIA or the FBI makes no sense at all. If the new department is to have first-rate and timely intelligence, it must have many widely dispersed analytic centers, each supporting one of the various agencies and activities within the department. Each of these analytic centers needs to be able to “subscribe” to the national collection systems—signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, human intelligence, and counterintelligence.

The needs of executive branch policymakers, for whom this intelligence was primarily produced, tended to be secondary in both agencies’ calculations. The handling of intelligence analysis on al Qaeda in the weeks and days leading up to the events of 11 September 2001 offers another example of problems in both analysis and distribution of intelligence. The FBI’s jealousy over its counterintelligence turf, not only vis-à-vis the CIA but also vis-à-vis the military services’ counterintelligence analysis (as well as operations), is a similar symptom of structural problems.

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