By David P. Nickles, Edward C. Keefer
This quantity files fluctuations in Sino-American relatives, starting from the euphoria lingering from President Nixon’s stopover at to China in 1972, to the sensible demanding situations of normalizing diplomatic relatives among Washington and Beijing.
Read or Download Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976 PDF
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Extra resources for Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976
These are the major things I wanted to mention to you. I don’t think you have instructions to give a long reply. ) Ambassador Huang: We will report what you said to Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Dr. Kissinger: I also have a very selfish reason—if you can convince your allies to settle by the 10th, then we can still see one of the performances of the acrobats on the 11th. ) Ambassador Huang: They won’t leave until the 13th. Dr. Kissinger: From Washington? I thought they would be there three days. (There was then some discussion on when the acrobats would be in Washington.
Kissinger a happy New Year. Dr. Kissinger: Thank you very much. I appreciate it. When I come to Peking, or through some other formula, we will be prepared to discuss Cambodia with you as I pointed out to the Prime Minister. It is always a pleasure to see you, Mr. Ambassador, though it is not frequent enough. ) Ambassador Huang: This evening our acrobatic troupe performed in New York City. Dr. Kissinger: I didn’t think carefully enough—maybe I should have arranged to see them here. Ambassador Huang: We are very sorry we were late because many representatives to the United Nations were present, and also some American friends.
In connection to that, stop in San Clemente. Nixon: Oh, I see. I will not in 4 years go to the UN. I’m never going there again. Kissinger: But of course, it hurts you. If he goes to the UN, he’s going to give a tough— Nixon: Sure. Kissinger: Now the disadvantage of having Brezhnev in October is that he’ll certainly go to the UN. Nixon: Oh, well, Henry that’s part of it. What the hell do we care. Kissinger: We shouldn’t care. Nixon: Look, we always worry about them huffing and puffing. There are worse things.